On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Watson v. Republican National Committee et al., No. 24-1260, holding that the federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots that are postmarked by election day but received up to five days thereafter, because "nothing in the federal-election day statutes requires ballots to be received by election day."
Three federal statutes — 3 U.S.C. § 1, 2 U.S.C.§ 1, and 2 U.S.C. § 7 — set the day for the "election" of Representatives, Senators, and the President on a Tuesday in November. The Court observed that "roughly 30 States count at least some absentee ballots mailed by election day but received afterward." Mississippi is among those states, permitting certain residents, "like college students away from home and senior citizens," to vote in federal elections by absentee ballot, and requires that all absentee ballots be "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election," Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-15-637(1)(a), (3).
In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, and several individuals sued various Mississippi state election officials, arguing that federal law prevents Mississippi from counting absentee ballots received after election day. The Libertarian Party of Mississippi filed a similar suit. The District Court consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment to Mississippi. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the state's mail-ballot statute is preempted because the federal election-day statutes require ballots to be received by election day. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc, and the Court granted certiorari.
The Court reversed and remanded. The question before the Court was a "narrow one about timing." The Court held that the federal election-day statutes do not preempt Mississippi's law "because the defining element of an 'election' . . . has always been the electorate's choice of candidate." Applying the "fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute," the Court explained that "election" was understood to mean "[t]he act of choosing a person to fill an office," and that "[f]rom time immemorial . . . an election to public office has been in point of substance no more and no less than the expression by qualified electors of their choice of candidates." Because "[t]he electorate's choice is made when voting is complete, not when ballots are received," the federal election-day statutes govern the act of voting rather than receipt. The Court found this reading reinforced by the Presidential election-day statute, which provides that when "States 'modif[y] the period of voting' in response to certain force majeure events, the term 'election day' shall 'include the modified period of voting,'" and by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, which "repeatedly presupposes that ballot receipt is a matter of state law." The Court added that its interpretation "is consistent with the way the Constitution treats elections," which "requires the 'Day on which [the electors] shall give their Votes' to be 'the same throughout the United States,'" but "says nothing about the day for receipt."
The Court determined that plaintiffs' contrary view, which relies on historical practice, precedent, and policy, was unpersuasive. The Court reasoned that "historical practice, detached from statutory text, is not controlling," reasoning that "[s]tatutes do not 'tra[p] in amber' every contemporary practice on the same subject matter"; that plaintiffs "overread" Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997), which "is not about ballot receipt and nowhere mentions it"; and that plaintiffs' "policy arguments are properly directed to legislatures, not courts." The Court also concluded that, "post-election day receipt, considered on its own, does not conflict with the election-day statutes," and "state law is preempted by the federal election-day statutes only 'so far as the conflict extends.'"
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined, and in which Justice Kavanaugh joined as to all but Parts II-C-2 and III.
