Haaland v. Brackeen, Cherokee Nation v. Brackeen, Texas v. Haaland, Brackeen v. Haaland, Nos. 21-376, 21-377, 21-378 & 21-380.
For decades, the federal Indian Child Welfare Act has required state courts to follow certain rules and procedures giving preference to the adoption or foster of Indian children by members of their own families or tribes (or, failing that, members of other tribes) over their adoption or foster care by non-Indians. Do the plaintiffs, who are non-Indian couples who adopted or tried to adopt Indian children and the birth mother of an Indian child who wished the child to be adopted by a non-Indian, have standing to challenge the validity of the statutory preferences? If so:
- Does the Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause give Congress authority to enact adoption preferences like these?
- Are the adoption preferences an impermissible attempt by Congress to commandeer the operations of state agencies and courts?
- Are the adoption preferences a racial classification forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause?
- Is there a rational basis for the adoption preferences?
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, No. 20-493.
The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act prohibits gaming activities on tribal lands if those activities are also prohibited under Texas law. If Texas regulates a gaming activity but does not prohibit it, does the Restoration Act apply those regulations on the Tribes’ lands?
Denezpi v. United States, No. 20-7622.
When the United States prosecutes a defendant in a Court of Indian Offenses and obtains a conviction for violating tribal law, under what circumstances (if any) does the Double Jeopardy Clause prevent the defendant from being prosecuted in U.S. District Court for violating federal law, based on the same conduct?
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429.
Does a State have jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country?