On June 18, 2026, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234, holding that the government's prosecution of a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits those who unlawfully use a controlled substance from possessing a gun, violates the Second Amendment.
The government investigated Mr. Hemani for suspected terrorism-related activities. Mr. Hemani cooperated with the investigation, surrendering a gun he kept in his home and volunteering that he used marijuana about every other day. The government then charged him with knowingly possessing a gun in his home while being an "unlawful user" of a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Section 922(g)(3) provides that anyone who is an "unlawful user of" or "addicted to" a "controlled substance" is banned from possessing a gun. "Controlled substance" is defined under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to include drugs ranging from heroin to Tylenol with codeine.
Mr. Hemani moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that enforcement of Section 922(g)(3) against him violated the Second Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Section 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Hemani. The government sought review before the Supreme Court, and it affirmed the Fifth Circuit's ruling on those grounds.
The Supreme Court began with the basic principle that the Second Amendment protects the rights of all Americans to keep and bear firearms for self-defense, though that has limits. Per New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, if the Amendment's terms address the conduct in question, the Constitution presumptively protects it. To overcome the presumption, the government must show that its regulatory efforts are consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The government agreed that Section 922(g)(3) burdens presumptively protected conduct but claimed the provision could be analogized to historical "habitual drunkard" laws (which prohibited "habitual drunkards" from possessing firearms). The Government contended that, like Section 922(g)(3), those laws (1) targeted habitual drunkards because they regularly used intoxicants, (2) were meant to protect the public from violent persons, and (3) were used to detain people in places where they could not bear arms. The Court rejected that argument at every turn.
First, as to the regular use of intoxicants, the Court noted that habitual drunkards were not just regular drinkers but, rather, those who drank so excessively they could not conduct their own affairs. That is, the laws did not target those who simply used intoxicants regularly, but those whose drinking rendered them practically incapacitated. The government did not claim Section 922(g)(3) requires showing an individual is regularly incapacitated, and as such, the analogy between the habitual drunkard laws and Section 922(g)(3) failed.
Second, the Court also rejected the government's argument that habitual drunkard laws and Section 922(g)(3) disarmed dangerous individuals. Canvassing the drunkard laws, the Court reasoned that the laws had little to do with protecting the public from violent people and more to do with protecting the habitual drunkards from themselves, their families from financial ruin, and the community from moral scandal.
Third, the Court concluded that the way the habitual drunkard laws worked to detain people was fundamentally different from Section 922(g)(3) because the drunkard laws provided process before an individual lost his liberties, but the government claimed Section 922(g)(3) automatically divests a person of the right to bear arms once he becomes an unlawful user.
The Court took further issue with the government's assertion that the purpose of Section 922(g)(3) was to disarm violent individuals because the statute takes its "controlled substances" definition from the CSA, a statute animated by a variety of concerns beyond classifying categorically dangerous drugs. The Court reasoned the government's treatment of the drug at issue demonstrated this point — marijuana had been moved from Schedule I to Schedule III after oral argument, and since 2013 the Department of Justice had directed prosecutors to curtail their enforcement efforts against marijuana users, which led to the proliferation of its use by the American people in recent years and its legalization in several states.
The Court closed by reiterating that its ruling was a narrow one — the government maintained that it could strip Mr. Hemani of his right to possess a firearm because he uses marijuana a few times a week, regardless of how much marijuana he consumes or what effect it has on him. That expansive theory, backed only by the government's claim that Section 922(g)(3) could be likened to habitual drunkard laws, did not comply with the Second Amendment, the Court concluded.
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. And Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan joined.
