Supreme Court Decides Flowers Foods, Inc. et al. v. Brock

On May 28, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Flowers Foods, Inc. et al. v. Brock, No. 24-935, holding that a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey, but does not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do, can qualify for the exemption in § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which provides nothing in the FAA shall be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving the "contracts of employment" of any class of workers "engaged in . . . interstate commerce."

The FAA requires courts to enforce many, but not all, private arbitration agreements. Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing" in the FAA shall be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving the "contracts of employment" of any class of workers "engaged in . . . inter-state commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1.

Flowers Foods, Inc., is one of the US's largest producers of packaged baked goods. To get its products to market, Flowers uses franchisees who buy rights to distribute Flowers' products in particular geographic territories. One such franchisee served the Denver, Colorado, area by picking up Flowers' products from a warehouse, delivering them to local stores without leaving Colorado. The distribution agreement with Flowers provided that the parties would resolve any disputes by arbitration, rather than litigation.

Plaintiff sued Flowers in federal district court, alleging it had underpaid him in violation of federal and state laws. Flowers moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied Flowers' motion; and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Plaintiff belonged to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce and thus the FAA § 1 exemption applied. Flowers petitioned to the Supreme Court for certiorari, asking it to answer whether someone can qualify as a worker "engaged in . . . interstate commerce" under § 1 if the worker never crosses state lines and never interacts with vehicles that do.

The unanimous Court answered in affirmative; it rejected Flower's invitation to adopt a bright-line rule that a worker can never qualify for § 1's exemption unless the worker crosses state lines or interacts with vehicles that do. The Court explained that this result is supported by the statutory text. For example, when the FAA was enacted, to "engage" meant to "take part in" something, and "interstate commerce" meant "traffic," "intercourse," or "the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states . . . or from or between points in one state and points in another state." But those terms do not require an individual to cross state lines or interact with a vehicle that does. Interstate commerce includes continuous journeys comprised of, e.g., a series of intrastate efforts, and a worker can take part or be involved in a continuous journey without himself or herself leaving a state or touching vehicles that do.

Justice Gorsuch delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.