Supreme Court Decides BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman

On June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court decided BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman et al., No. 23-1259, holding that the “catchall” provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which permits a district court to grant relief from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief” applies only in “extraordinary circumstances,” even where the movant seeks to reopen a case to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiffs/respondents were the victims and the families of victims of Hamas-associated terrorist attacks carried out between December 2001 and August 2003. Plaintiffs sued defendant/petitioner BLOM Bank SAL (an international bank) under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d) (JASTA). Plaintiffs alleged that BLOM aided and abetted Hamas by providing financial services to customers who were allegedly affiliated with Hamas.

BLOM moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint were insufficient to state a claim of aiding and abetting under JASTA. Plaintiffs repeatedly represented to the district court that they did not wish to amend their complaint. The district court agreed with BLOM that the allegations were insufficient to state a claim because plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege “that, by providing financial services to [specific customers], BLOM generally assumed a role in Hamas’ violent or life-endangering activities[.]” The district court granted BLOM’s motion to dismiss, and denied plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court’s order required more foreseeability than is necessary for aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court had imposed an unduly high foreseeability requirement, but found that plaintiffs’ complaint failed even under a lower foreseeability standard, and affirmed the dismissal.

Plaintiffs then moved to reopen the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) so they could file an amended complaint. The district court denied their request, reasoning that the Second Circuit’s clarification of the aiding-and-abetting foreseeability standard under JASTA did not qualify as “extraordinary circumstances” and thus was insufficient to reopen the judgment under Rule 60(b)’s catchall provision. Plaintiffs appealed again. The Second Circuit concluded that, in considering plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion, the district court should have weighed both Rule 60(b)’s philosophy in preserving the finality of judgments and Rule 15(a)’s liberal policy of freely giving leave to amend complaints when justice requires, and thus erred by denying the motion only under Rule 60(b).

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party seeking to reopen a judgment and re-plead must first satisfy Rule 60(b) on its own terms before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply. The Second Circuit’s balancing approach conflates this order of operations and dilutes Rule 60(b)(6)’s well-established extraordinary circumstances requirement. That requirement is not less demanding when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant also hopes to amend his complaint.”

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.