Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) Amended to Expressly Allow After-Hours Debt-Collection Emails

At a Glance

• Florida’s governor recently signed Senate Bill 232, which amended Fla. Stat. § 559.72(17) (Subsection 17) of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA, Fla. Stat. §§ 559.55–559.785).
• Subsection 17 prohibits certain debt-collection “communications” to debtors between 9 p.m. and 8 a.m.
• Entrepreneurial plaintiffs recently began filing hundreds of lawsuits alleging that Subsection 17 applied to not only calls but also emails.
• After courts disagreed about whether Subsection 17 applies to emails, the Florida legislature passed SB 232 to confirm that it does not.
• Although part of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p) is similar to the prior version of Subsection 17, it lacks the sort of plaintiff-friendly provisions that make a similar wave of predatory litigation unlikely.

Florida’s Governor Signs Key Amendment to the FCCPA

On May 16, 2025, Florida’s governor signed SB 232, which amended Subsection 17 and took effect immediately. Subsection 17 prohibits certain debt-collection “communications” to debtors between 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. SB 232 now clarifies that Subsection 17 does not apply to emails.

Prior to SB 232’s passage, Subsection 17 provided:

In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: (17) Communicate with the debtor between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. in the debtor’s time zone without the prior consent of the debtor.

1. The person may presume that the time a telephone call is received conforms to the local time zone assigned to the area code of the number called, unless the person reasonably believes that the debtor’s telephone is located in a different time zone.
2. If, such as with toll-free numbers, an area code is not assigned to a specific geographic area, the person may presume that the time a telephone call is received conforms to the local time zone of the debtor’s last known place of residence, unless the person reasonably believes that the debtor’s telephone is located in a different time zone.

Fla. Stat. § 559.72(17).

Pre-Amendment Interpretations of Subsection 17

Before its amendment, the only mode of communication explicitly referenced in Subsection 17 was telephone calls. As is often the case, however, enterprising plaintiffs noticed that a defined term — here, “communication” — could arguably be read as applying more broadly. See Fla. Stat. § 559.55(2) (defining “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”). This resulted in hundreds of lawsuits — many of them filed as class actions — targeting emails that had been sent during the “quiet hours” between 9 p.m. and 8 a.m.

Although those claims found no support in the legislative history or intent of the FCCPA, courts disagreed about whether Subsection 17 applies to emails. On the one hand, several courts held that Subsection 17 did not apply to “more-passive forms of communications like email and snail mail.” See Chandler v. Capital One, No. 2025-SC-001454-O, 2025 WL 1265845 (9th Fla. Cir. Ct., Orange Cnty., Apr. 29, 2025); see also Diaz v. Afterpay US Services, LLC, No. 24-CC-054641, 2025 WL 1189638 (Fla. Cnty. Ct., Hillsborough Cnty., Apr. 22, 2025); Warner v. Goldman Sachs Bank USA, No. 05-2024-SC-026875, 2024 WL 4905183 (Fla. Cnty. Ct., Brevard Cnty., Nov. 3, 2024) (“[T]he receipt of an email communication is no different than receipt of physical mail, which is silently delivered to a mailbox and the recipient elects when to retrieve it from the mailbox.”); Remus v. Riverview Sunshine Investments, No. 23-001459-CI (6th Fla. Cir. Ct., Pinellas Cnty, Jan. 22, 2024 and Mar. 4, 2024).

On the other hand, some courts held that Subsection 17 was in fact broad enough to cover emails because (1) the plain language of the statute did not place any explicit restrictions on the definition of “communication,” and (2) in construing the FCCPA, “due consideration and great weight” was required to be given to interpretations by federal agencies and courts related to the FDCPA, which have provided that a similar FDCPA provision prohibiting after-hours debt-collection communications applies to emails. See Diaz v. Capital One, No. 24-CA-004019, 2025 WL 359182 (13th Fla. Cir. Ct., Hillsborough Cnty., Jan. 17, 2025); Waters v. Ausit St. Augustine, LLC, No. SP23-4309, 2025 WL 1147386 (Fla. Cnty. Ct., St. Johns Cnty., Jan. 16, 2025); Quinn-Davis v. TrueAccord Corp., No. 1:23-cv-23590, 2024 WL 4851344 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2024) (finding that liability could arise, but only if an email was “opened” between 9 p.m. and 8 a.m.).

The Legislative Intent Behind SB 232

In light of this ambiguity, SB 232 (along with its companion bill HB 147) was introduced earlier this year to clarify that Subsection 17 does not apply to email communications. SB 232’s prefatory language notes that Subsection 17 was adopted before email communication became commonly used and that the only specific communication explicitly contemplated in Subsection 17 was telephone calls. It also states that the intent of the Legislature is to update and clarify the statute because emails are “less invasive and less disruptive than telephone calls.” Subsection 17 is now revised to include the following:

This subsection does not apply to an e-mail communication that is sent to an e-mail address and that otherwise complies with [Fla. Stat. § 559.72].

SB 232 does not explicitly reference retroactivity, so its impact on unresolved cases that were filed prior to its enactment is unclear. That issue will surely be litigated in coming months.

Subsection 17’s FDCPA Counterpart

Like Subsection 17, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) of the federal FDCPA prohibits debt collection communications between 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. Notably, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau has suggested that Section 1692c(a)(1) should be read as applying to emails. See 12 C.F.R. Part 1006, effective Nov. 30, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/30/2020-24463/debt-collection-practices-regulation-f#print (last visited May 27, 2025); CFPB Interpretation of 12 C.F.R. Part 1006.6(b)(1)(i), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1006/6/ (last visited on May 27, 2025).

A wave of similar litigation under the FDCPA is unlikely, however, as the FDCPA does not have the same plaintiff-friendly provisions as the FCCPA. For instance, the FCCPA provides:

1. broad applicability to all persons or businesses collecting consumer debts including original creditors, as opposed to the FDCPA’s more limited focus on third-party collectors (compare Fla. Stat. § 559.77(1) (providing that “a debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 559.72”) (emphasis added) with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (providing that “any debt collector who fails to comply…is liable”) (emphasis added);
2. the availability of punitive damages (compare Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2) with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)); and
3. a two-year statute of limitations, as opposed to the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations (compare Fla. Stat. § 559.77(4) with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)).

Thus, businesses other than third-party debt collectors are unlikely to see a significant increase of similar claims being filed under the FDCPA.

Conclusion

Given the proliferation of debt collection emails — which are used by 74% of debt collectors — SB 232’s enactment cuts off a significant source of potential liability. See Florida Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement for CS/CS/SB 232 at 3 n.17 (citing TransUnion, More Than Half of Debt Collection Companies Saw Increased Volume of Accounts in Past 12 Months). The Florida Legislature’s passage of reasonable remedial legislation should be welcome news to the many industries that have been plagued by predatory lawsuits filed under Subsection 17.