Supreme Court Decides National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

On June 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States decided National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission, No. 24-621, striking down a federal law that limits the amount of money a political party may spend on the campaign of a candidate for federal office, in coordination with that candidate's campaign.

In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act to limit the amount of money a political party may spend on the political campaign of a candidate for federal office, in coordination with that candidate's campaign. Almost 30 years later, the Supreme Court upheld this statutory limitation as constitutional in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commission, 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 

In 2022, the National Republican Senatorial and Congressional Committees, along with then-candidates for the US Senate and US House of Representatives, challenged the coordinated-expenditure limitation as contrary to the First Amendment of the US Constitution. The Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee intervened in support of the limitation. The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the limitation. 

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the coordinated-expenditure limitation violates the First Amendment and expressly overruling its 2001 decision upholding the law. 

In reaching that conclusion, the Court first rejected the intervenors' argument that the case was moot. It found that the Act's private enforcement mechanism, as well as at least one individual plaintiff's maintenance of an active statement of candidacy for federal office, ensured that the controversy remained live. 

The Court then canvassed the historical evidence of coordination between political parties and their chosen candidates, finding that, for "nearly 200 years after the ratification of the First Amendment, parties could spend freely to support their candidates during campaigns and could do so in coordination with the candidates." In light of that history, the Court observed that "the restriction on political-party coordinated expenditures would appear to violate the First Amendment." The Court recognized, however, that its 2001 Colorado decision had reached a contrary conclusion. It therefore proceeded to reexamine that precedent. 

After reviewing its recent First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court concluded that the precise degree of scrutiny to be applied was ultimately an "academic" question in this case because the challenged statute violated even the more permissive articulation of the relevant standard. Applying that standard, the Court first analyzed the proffered interests supporting the statutory restriction on coordinated expenditures, holding that there was "only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption" and that the only form of corruption that could be permissibly targeted was "quid pro quo" corruption. 

While the Court acknowledged the coordinated-expenditure limit may help prevent donors from circumventing this quid pro quo corruption ban, it found that a combination of other federal laws significantly mitigates that risk, even absent the coordinated-expenditure limit. Against that backdrop, because the limit significantly hindered political parties' ability to fulfill their purpose of supporting their candidates of choice, the Court found the law "disproportionate" and not "necessary" or "narrowly tailored" to the goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The Court declined to nonetheless uphold the law on the basis of stare decisis, finding the Court's intervening decisions confirm that its 2001 decision upholding the coordinated-expenditure limit "is no longer good law."

Justice Kavanaugh delivered the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.