Supreme Court Decides Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

On May 14, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238, holding that a plaintiff's claim that a freight broker negligently hired a motor carrier to transport goods is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act because, under the FAAAA, states retain authority to regulate safety with respect to motor vehicles.

Freight brokers connect sellers with motor carriers that can transport the sellers' goods. As payment, brokers receive the difference between the price a seller pays to move the goods and the carrier's transportation fee.

In 1980, concerned that existing federal regulations were stifling brokers' development, Congress deregulated aspects of the trucking industry by passing the Motor Carrier Act. Despite the existing federal regulatory framework, states also passed regulations that impacted — and inhibited competition within — the trucking industry. Congress addressed that problem in 1994 by passing the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, which expressly preempts certain state regulations involving motor carriers and other players in the trucking industry, including brokers. This preemption provision, though broad, also contains exceptions, including one providing that the FAAAA "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."

Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when a tractor-trailer careened off course and collided with Montgomery's own truck while he was stopped on the side of the road. Montgomery sued the negligent driver as well as Caribe Transport, the motor carrier for which the negligent driver was working at the time of the accident, and C.H. Robinson, the freight broker that had arranged for Caribe Transport to deliver the load that driver was carrying. Montgomery alleged that C.H. Robinson therefore knew or should have known that choosing Caribe Transport to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others. C.H. Robinson moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Montgomery's negligent hiring claim was expressly preempted by the FAAAA. The District Court agreed and entered a judgment in C.H. Robinson's favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, finding that while Montgomery's negligent hiring claim fell within the FAAAA's preemption provision, it was saved by the FAAAA's safety exception. Acknowledging that all parties agreed that common-law duties and standards of care form part of a state's authority to regulate safety, the Supreme Court determined that the question boiled down to whether Montgomery's negligent hiring claim was a claim "with respect to motor vehicles," as the safety exception requires. The FAAAA does not define the phrase "with respect to" but the Court construed it as meaning "concerns" or "regards." So, putting the pieces together, the Court concluded that the safety exception saves a claim from being preempted if the claim "concerns" or "regards" the vehicles used in transportation.

Requiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier, the Court found, "concerns" motor vehicles — i.e., the trucks that will transport the goods. Consequently, Montgomery's negligent-hiring claim fell within the FAAAA's safety exception, which saved it from preemption.

The Supreme Court agreed that this interpretation leads to an anomaly in the FAAAA since another subsection of the statute preempts state regulation of "intrastate" rates, routes, or services "of any freight forwarder or broker." It is unclear, the Court granted, why Congress would completely preempt state regulation of brokers for intrastate rates, routes, and services while only partially preempting state regulation of brokers for interstate rates, routes, and services. But the Court nevertheless concluded it would be even odder to say that the alleged tort — the negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused an injury — is not an exercise of "the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." Better to live with the mystery than to rewrite the statute, the Court determined.

Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Alito joined.