Supreme Court Decides Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

On April 22, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, No. 24-783, holding that the statutory 30-day deadline to remove a state-court lawsuit to federal court cannot be extended by equitable tolling principles.

Enbridge Energy operates a petroleum pipeline that runs from northwestern Wisconsin to Michigan and into Canada. In 2019, the Michigan Attorney General filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court seeking to halt Enbridge's operation of the pipeline, contending that an easement granted by the state of Michigan in 1953 was void. For several months after being served with the Attorney General's complaint, Enbridge briefed dispositive motions and attended hearings arguing the claims against it were preempted by federal law. But Enbridge did not remove the case to federal court.

Over a year later, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a notice revoking the 1953 easement and filed a separate state-court lawsuit against Enbridge to enforce that notice. Enbridge removed the Governor's action to federal court, arguing that the federal district court had jurisdiction because the case involved a substantial federal question. Enbridge did not remove the Attorney General's suit at that time; instead, the parties agreed to abate the Attorney General's case while proceedings progressed in Gov. Whitmer's suit. The Governor moved to remand her case to state court, but the district court denied her motion, and she voluntarily dismissed the suit soon after.

Following the district court's denial of Gov. Whitmer's motion to remand her lawsuit, Enbridge removed the Attorney General's suit to federal court. By that time, 887 days had passed since Enbridge had first received the Attorney General's complaint. The Attorney General moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that Enbridge's removal was untimely because it had not removed the case within 30 days as the applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), requires. The district court held that equitable principles justified excusing Enbridge's untimely removal and denied the Attorney General's motion. The district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Enbridge then sought — and was granted — a writ of certiorari.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the text, structure, and context of the removal statute establish that Congress did not intend for the 30-day deadline to be subject to equitable tolling. The Supreme Court thus agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the statutory 30-day removal deadline cannot be extended by equitable tolling principles. It held as much for three reasons.

First, Section 1446(b)(1) speaks in strict, mandatory terms, requiring that a notice of removal "shall be filed within 30 days" of the defendant receiving a complaint or summons, "whichever period is shorter." This strict phrasing is consistent with treating the statutory deadline as mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling.

Second, the structure of Section 1446(b)(1) and the related removal statutes, including their explicit listing of detailed exceptions to the 30-day deadline, indicated that Congress did not intend for courts to read other, unmentioned, open-ended, equitable exceptions into the removal statutes. Section 1446, for example, provides that the ordinary 30-day deadline does not apply when a case at first appears unremovable, but a later "pleading, motion, order or other paper" reveals that it is (or has become) removable. In that instance, the removal deadline begins to run from the date on which the defendant receives the new paper from which it became ascertainable that the case could be removed. The statute cabins that exception, though, by specifying that, in certain circumstances, it does not apply if one year has passed since the action was first filed, unless the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent a defendant from removing the case. Structurally, Congress already incorporated one form of equitable tolling by adding that particularized exception to the statute, and further accounted for other equitable factors in limiting the application of that exception. Ultimately, the Court determined that it would be inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme to extend the deadline still further through the doctrine of equitable tolling outside of specified, enumerated exceptions.

Finally, the Court focused on context: the federal civil removal statutes reflect an obvious concern with efficiency and a general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold questions that are unrelated to the merits of a case. That is reflected not only in the short deadline for removal, but also the strict 30-day deadline for a plaintiff to seek remand of a removed action back to state court and the statute's default rule that remand orders are not appealable. Allowing equitable tolling of the statutory deadline would therefore undermine Congress's manifest interest in resolving threshold removal questions early and conclusively.

The Court therefore affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision that Enbridge's removal was untimely and found the case must be remanded to Michigan state court.

Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous.