1			ES DISTRICT COURT	
2		DISTRICT OF	'NEW JERSEY	
3	RYAN RUSSELL,			
4	KIAN KUSSELL,	PLAINTIFF		
5	Vs.		CIVIL NO. 16-1190 (PGS)	
6	CROSCILL HOME,	LLC, DEFENDANT	10 1130 (135)	
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9			COBER 11, 2016 ARKSON S. FISHER COURTHOUS	E
10			E EAST STATE STREET NOTON, NEW JERSEY 08608	
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13	BEFORE:	U.S. DIST	ABLE PETER G. SHERIDAN RICT COURT JUDGE	
14		DISTRICT	OF NEW JERSEY	
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17			D-01-00	•
18 19	COURT'S OPINION	N ON MOTION TO	DISMISS	
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21				
22		Cartifie	ed as true and correct as	required
23		by Title	e 28, U.S.C. Section 753 acis J. Gable	required
24		FRANCIS	J. GABLE, C.S.R., R.M.R. U.S. REPORTER	
25		(856) 88		

	1	THE COURT: This matter comes before the Court on a
	2	motion to dismiss plaintiff's class action complaint, or in
	3	the alternative to dismiss the plaintiff's class action
	4	allegations pursuant to Federal Rules 12 and 23. On March 2,
00:00	5	2016, plaintiff filed this class action complaint alleging
	6	that certain terms of the consumer contract issued by
	7	defendant violate the New Jersey Truth in Consumer Contract
	8	Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) N.J.S.A. 56:12-14. Plaintiff
	9	alleges diversity because Croscill is incorporated in Delaware
00:01	10	and headquartered in New York, and plaintiff resides in Ocean
	11	County, New Jersey. (Complaint at paragraph 3.) The
	12	plaintiff also asserts jurisdiction under the Class Action
	13	Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332.
	14	This motion focuses on whether the plaintiff has
00:01	15	standing to sue, Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016); or
	16	whether plaintiff is an "aggrieved" consumer as set forth in
	17	TCCWNA. The complaint alleges defendant "imposed unfair,
	18	one-sided provisions in its terms and conditions in violation
	19	of certain statutory and common law standards and TCCWNA.
00:02	20	(Complaint at paragraph 2.) Factually, plaintiff ordered and
	21	purchased a Longmont Tea-light Holder by using defendant's
	22	website. (Complaint at paragraph 4.) The defendant's
	23	website, in addition to a purchase order, sets forth the terms
	24	and conditions of the purchase (complaint at paragraph 12),
00:03	25	which allegedly violated TCCWNA. (Complaint at paragraph 17.)

	1	Most notably, plaintiff alleged that at least four provisions
	2	of the terms and conditions violate TCCWNA. They are: (1)
,	3	a provision which "bars plaintiffs from asserting any cause of
	4	action" (complaint at paragraph 19); (2) a provision which
00:03	5	"deprives individuals of their rights under the New Jersey
	6	Products Liability Act" (complaint at paragraph 24); (3) a
	7	provision which "bars plaintiff from asserting punitive
	8	damages in violation of the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act"
	9	(complaint at paragraph 33); and (4), a provision which
00:04	10	"denies consumers their rights and remedies under the
	11	UCCfor economic harm and/or harm to property." (complaint
	12	at paragraph 40).
	13	The complaint also alleges in paragraphs 45, 46 and
	14	47 that "New Jersey consumer protection laws, including the
00:04	15	TCCWNA, are designed to protect individuals from the type of
	16	unconscionable and illegal provisions contained in defendant's
	17	terms and conditions." The defendant's imposition upon
	18	consumers of the above described terms and conditions violate
	19	certain common law standards, including, but not limited to,
00:05	20	the Product Liability Act, the Punitive Damages Act, Uniform
	21	Commercial Code, and therefore violates TCCWNA. And finally
	22	that the plaintiff brings this statutory claim to "halt
	23	defendant's continued use of the illegal language in its
	24	disclaimers of liability provisions included in the terms and
00:05	25	conditions as set forth on the defendant's website."

	1	Despite the above allegations, nowhere in the
	2	complaint does plaintiff allege that the Longmont Tea-light
	3	Holder he purchased was defective, or that any of the terms
	4	and conditions outlined above were invoked by the defendant in
00:06	5	any claim that plaintiff had. In fact, the complaint lacks
	6	any allegation that plaintiff read the terms and conditions or
	7	that the plaintiffs were in any way injured.
	8	Since this is a class action complaint, even the
	9	scope of the class is very broad, and it does not assert any
00:07	10	type of injury. The class is defined as "all individuals in
	11	the State of New Jersey to whom were offered, given,
	12	displayed, or entered into the terms and conditions referred
	13	herein on defendant's websiteduring the applicable statute
	14	of limitations through the date of final judgment in this
00:07	15	action." (Complaint at paragraph 48.)
	16	The complaint seeks only one count for violations of
	17	TCCWNA. (Complaint at paragraphs 60-72.) There is no injury
	18	alleged, except a broad generalization that defendant is a
	19	seller (complaint at paragraph 62), and plaintiff is a
00:08	20	consumer (complaint at paragraph 63). As a result, "plaintiff
	21	seeks judgment awarding the plaintiff and class members of not
	22	less than \$100 for each violation of TCCWNA", and "order
	23	terminating the provisions referred to above." "The purpose
	24	of TCCWNA is to prevent deceptive practices and consumer
00:09	25	contracts, by prohibiting the use of illegal terms or

	1	warranties in consumer contracts." Matijakovich v. PC				
	2	Richards & Son, 2016 WL 3457011 at *2 (D.N.J. June 21, 2016);				
	3	(citing Kent Motor Cars v. Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002 N.J.				
	4	424237 (N.J. 2011)).				
00:12	5	The Act states in relevant part:				
	6	"No seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee shall				
	7	in the course of his business offer to any consumer or				
	8	prospective consumer or enter into any written consumer				
	9	contract or give or display any written consumer warranty				
00:12	10	notice or sign after the effective date of this Act,				
	11	which includes any provision that violates any clearly				
	12	established legal right of a consumer or				
	13	responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or				
	14	bailee as established by state or federal law at the time				
00:12	15	the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or				
	16	the warranty notice or sign is given or displayed.				
	17	Consumer means any individual who buys leases, borrows or				
	18	bails any money, property or service which is primarily				
	19	for personal family or household purposes. (N.J.S.A.				
00:13	20	56:12-15.)"				
	21	Generally, in order to state a claim under TCCWNA, a				
	22	plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is a				
	23	consumer; (2) the defendant is a seller; (3) the seller offers				
	24	a consumer contract; and (4) the contract includes a provision				
00:13	25	that violates any legal right of the consumer or				

	1	responsibility of the seller. That's Matijakovich, 2016 WL
	2	3457011 at *2.
	3	Moreover the statute provides that "any person who
	4	violates the provisions of this Act shall be liable to the
00:14	5	aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less than \$100,
	6	or actual damages or both, at the election of the consumer,
	7	together with reasonable attorney fees and costs."
	8	In reviewing this motion I looked at two issues:
	9	Standing to sue under Spokeo v. Robins; and whether plaintiff
00:15	10	is an aggrieved consumer under TCCWNA.
,	11	Standing. In Spokeo, Justice Alito focused on the
	12	injury-in-fact requirement to show standing under Article III
	13	of the Constitution. 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016). The
	14	injury-in-fact requirement requires a plaintiff to allege an
00:15	15	injury that is both concrete and particularized. $\mathit{Id}.$ at 1545.
	16	In Spokeo, the complaint alleged a violation of the Fair
	17	Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The FCRA has a provision that is
	18	similar to the one alleged here under TCCWNA, that is, the
	19	FCRA states:
00:16	20	"Any person who willfully fails to comply with any
	21	requirement of the Act with respect to any individual, is
	22	liable to that individual for, among other things, either
	23	actual damages or statutory damages of \$100 to \$1,000 per
	24	violation, cost of the action, and attorney fees and
00:17	25	possibly punitive damages." That's Spokeo at 1543.

	1	Similarly, Spokeo and this case do not cite an
	2	injury in fact. In Spokeo, Justice Alito criticized the
	3	complaint because of its lack of factual basis. For instance,
	4	plaintiff alleged a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
00:17	5	Act, and Alito noted that "someone who was not identified
	6	requested a search of Robins' credit history." And Spokeo
	7	conducted the search by "some means not identified in the
	8	complaint." And somehow Robins became aware of the contents
	9	and discovered it contained inaccurate information. Id. at
00:18	10	1546. The Ninth Circuit found that Robins' alleged violations
	11	of the statutory rights were sufficient to satisfy the
	12	injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. Id. at 1546.
	13	Judge Alito opined that standing "limits the category of
	14	litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit." Id. at 1547.
00:19	15	Standing has three elements: (1) plaintiff suffered an injury
	16	in fact; (2) that is traceable to the challenged conduct of
	17	defendant; and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable
	18	judicial decision. <i>Id.</i> at 1547.
	19	Looking at the injury-in-fact requirement, Justice
00:19	20	Alito stated that Congress cannot erase Article III standing
	21	requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue a
	22	plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing. Id. at
	23	1547-48. That is, to establish an injury in fact, plaintiff
	24	must show that he suffered "an invasion of a legally protected
00:20	25	interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or

1 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 1548. 2 Particularization requires the injury must affect the 3 plaintiff in the personal and individual way. Id. at 1548. 4 Concrete injury must be de facto, that is, it must actually 00:20 5 exist. *Id.* at 1548. "Concrete is not...necessarily 6 synonymous with tangible." And "Congress' role in identifying 7 and elevating intangible harm does not mean that a plaintiff 8 automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right." Id. at 9 00:21 10 1549. 11 As a result, in Spokeo the court remanded the matter 12 for the court to determine whether there was a concrete injury 13 set forth in that complaint. Here, in looking at the Russell 14 complaint, it appears that there was no concrete injury 00:21 15 sustained by plaintiff. The plaintiff merely alleges a 16 statutory right to \$100 per violation under the Spokeo 17 rationale. Congress and in this case the state legislature 18 cannot through statute abrogate the standing requirements of 19 Article III. And, as such, the plaintiff has no standing to 20 00:23 sue in this case. 21 With regard to TCCWNA, the Court reasons the same 22 way as it did under Spokeo. Under TCCWNA, the plaintiff must 23 show that he is an "aggrieved" consumer in order to seek 24 monetary damages of \$100. As noted above, the plaintiff has

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not demonstrated that he's "aggrieved" under TCCWNA. In fact,

	1	the plaintiff does not even allege he viewed the illegal terms
	2	and conditions on the defendant's website, and there is no
	3	allegation of any injury to the plaintiffs. There is nothing
	4	that alleges the product was defective, and there is nothing
00:24	5	that indicates that the plaintiff sustained any type of
	6	injuries.
	7	In this case, we begin with the text of the statute
	8	itself. Watson v. DineEquity, 1591 Fed. App'x 132, 135 (3d.
	9	Cir. 2014). Here, TCCWNA does not define the word
00:25	10	"aggrieved". The Court adopts Black's Law Dictionary
	11	definition as "one entitled to a remedy, especially a party
	12	who's personal, pecuniary or property rights have been
	13	adversely affected by another person's action." Here, the
	14	plaintiff has not established any losses stemming from the
00:26	15	terms and conditions of the defendant's website, and therefore
	16	he is not an aggrieved consumer that is required to bring the
	17	statutory action. The plaintiff has cited to some legislative
	18	history which indicates that the legislature allowed recovery
	19	of the statutory damages whether the consumer was aggrieved or
00:27	20	not aggrieved; but the plain language of the statute controls.
	21	It must be accompanied by some injury in fact to be an
	22	aggrieved consumer. There is none shown here. So, even under
	23	TCCWNA, the complaint should be dismissed.
	24	Since the parties did not brief the Spokeo issue, if
00:28	25	either party wishes the Court to reconsider same, they may

1	file	а	motion	for	reconsideration.
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