









Background and Context New rules additive to SOX 304 clawbacks Rulemaking required by Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 DOJ expected to issue guidance on how government would consider clawbacks creating personal accountability for cooperation credit New rule do not impact clawbacks companies have voluntarily adopted for misconduct, etc. (SEC rule only relates to clawbacks triggered by restatements)

47

Policy Requirements • Adopt written policy providing that if: — Accounting restatement due to material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements, and — Noncompliance resulted in overpayment of incentive compensation within the three completed fiscal years preceding the date the restatement was required. Then, company will recover from its current and former executive officers, on a reasonably prompt basis the amount of any such erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation • Restatement required regardless of whether there was misconduct — Exceptions for retrospective application of change in accounting principle, revision to reportable segments or changes in capital structure — Exceptions where cost to recover exceeds recovery, violate home country laws (based on opinion of counsel) or would disqualify tax-qualified retirement plan












Pay versus Performance	Proxy statement must include Executive Pay versus Performance (PVP) disclosures Reports relationship between "compensation actually paid" for CEO and other NEOs and company financial performance For purposes of the PVP disclosure table, the measures of company financial performance are TSR Net Income A "Company-Selected Measure" The most important financial performance measure selected by the company Company TSR is also compared to peer group TSR
© 2023 Faegre Strinker Biddle & Raeth LLP, All Rights Reserved. Privileged	à Corriboral. Prej Versus Performance D =


		Compensation	Average Summary	Average Compensation Actually Paid to Non-PEO NEOs	Value of Initial Fixed \$100 Investment Based On:			CSM:
Year	Compensation Actually Paid to Table Total to PEO PEO¹		Compensation Table Total for Non-PEO NEOs		Company TSR	Peer Group TSR	Net Income	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(1)
2022	/ s	s	\$	\$	5	\$	\$	
2021	s	s	s	s	5	\$	\$	
2020	s	s	\$	s	s	5	\$	
Summa for each • If mo as Pl addit • Inclu- equit	al Compensation directly fi ry Compensation Table to covered year for the PEC re than one person serve EO for a covered year, ad- ional column for such per des separation pay, new it y grants, etc. Explain one payments in footnotes	adjusted to refi actually paid* Footnotes to include adju- the additional	al for PEO, as ect "compensation this column will streents, as shown in al reconciliation tables	(d) Total Compensal Summary Compensa NEOs, except that th Summary Compensa other NEOs is used • Identify in a footna individual NEOs in • Simple average, r NEOs in a year, ir pay, new hire equ one-time paymen	ation Table for othe e average from the ation Table for the other the neach year no matter how man includes separation ity grants, etc. Ex-	NEOs "comp	verage SCT total , as adjusted to re ensation actually strotes to this col- ude adjustments, additional recond	eflect paid" umn will uns shown in

Reconciliation Between Summary Compensation Table and "Compensation Actually Paid" Year Summary Compensation Actually Paid "Compensation Table Table Total to PEO Summary Compensation Actually Paid Actually Paid Table Total to PEO Summary Compensation Actually Paid Summary Compensation Actually Paid Summary Compensation Table (SCT) are adjusted to show Compensation Actually Paid for the PVP Table For pension costs, adjust the value of stock and option awards from the Summary Compensation Table amounts For pension costs, adjust the change in pension value The PVP Table does not show W-2 compensation for the covered year The summary Compensation Table amounts The PVP Table does not show W-2 compensation for the covered year These adjustments may cause Compensation Actually Paid to be a negative amount





































Compliance is Top-of-Mind for Current Government Officials

Kenneth A. Polite, Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Criminal Division

Previously served as the Chief Compliance Officer for Entergy, a Fortune 500 energy company

Glenn Leon, recently selected as Fraud Section Chief, DOJ Criminal Division

Previously served as the Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer at Hewlett Packard

Gurbir Grewal, SEC, Director of Enforcement
 In his first publicized speech as Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, Grewal spoke about the importance of "modeling excellence" in compliance efforts





AAG Polite's Recent Remarks on Compliance

- On March 25, 2022, Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite spoke at NYU Law's Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement
- DOJ expects "an effective corporate compliance program to be much more than a company's policies, procedures, and internal controls." DOJ expects to see programs that "(1) are well designed, (2) are adequately resourced and empowered to function effectively, and (3) work in practice."



70

CONTINUED

AAG Polite's Recent Remarks on Compliance

• Then in a significant departure, AAG Polite elevated the role of the CCO in corporate resolutions: "In order to further empower Chief Compliance Officers, for all of our corporate resolutions (including guilty pleas, deferred prosecution agreements, and non-prosecution agreements), I have asked my team to consider requiring both the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Compliance Officer to certify at the end of the term of the agreement that the company's compliance program is reasonably designed and implemented to detect and prevent violations of the law (based on the nature of the legal violation that gave rise to the resolution, as relevant), and is functioning effectively."

© 2023 Faegre Chinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved. Privileged & Confidential.

fore Governance, Executive Compensation, ESG and SEC Updates

O "

71

CONTINUE

AAG Polite's Recent Remarks on Compliance

"In instances where a monitor is not imposed and a company is required to provide annual self-reports on the state of their compliance programs, we will consider requiring that the CEO and the CCO will also have to certify that all compliance reports submitted during the term of the resolution are true, accurate, and complete."



vernance, Executive Compensation, ESG and SEC Updates



AAG Polite's Recent Remarks on Compliance

- DOJ also expects companies to measure and test the effectiveness of their compliance programs.
- AAG Polite put it this way: "We are also interested in how a company measures and tests its culture—at all levels of seniority and throughout its operations—and how it uses the data from that testing to embed and continuously improve its ethical culture."




73




AAG Polite's Summation

AAG Polite concluded: "Our message is clear – companies that make a serious investment in improving their compliance programs and internal controls will be viewed in a better light by the Department. Support your compliance team now or pay later."

More Governance, Executive Compensation, ESG and SEC Updates 74







DAG Monaco's Policy Pronouncements

- During a speech on September 15, 2022, Deputy AG Lisa Monaco announced significant policy changes to DOJ's corporate enforcement strategy.
- DOJ expects companies to do more to police themselves through investments in corporate compliance.
- Policy changes address prioritization of individual accountability; evaluation of prior misconduct, cooperation, and compliance program in determining corporate resolutions; benefits of voluntary self-disclosure; and use of monitors.



77

Renewed Focus on the Timeliness of Cooperation

- "Going forward, undue or intentional delay in producing information or documents—particularly those that show individual culpability—will result in the <u>reduction or denial of cooperation credit.</u>"
- "If a cooperating company discovers hot documents or evidence, its first reaction should be to notify the prosecutors. This requirement is in addition to prior guidance that corporations must provide all relevant, non-privileged facts about individual misconduct to receive any cooperation credit."

More Governance, Executive	Compensation, ESG and SEC Updates	0,	







Benefits of Voluntary Self-Disclosure

- Self-disclosure remains the "clearest path" to avoiding a guilty plea or indictment.
- DOJ seeks "to reward those companies whose historical investments in compliance enable voluntary selfdisclosure and to incentivize other companies to make the same investments going forward."

More Governance	e, Executive	Compensation,	ESG and SEC Updates	



79

Benefits of Voluntary Self-Disclosure

- "[F]or the first time ever, every Department component that prosecutes corporate crime will have a program that incentivizes voluntary selfdisclosure. If a component currently lacks a formal, documented policy, it must draft one.
- "Absent aggravating factors, the Department will not seek a guilty plea when a company has voluntarily self-disclosed, cooperated, and remediated misconduct."
- "In addition, the Department will not require an independent compliance monitor for such a corporation if, at the time of resolution, it also has implemented and tested an effective compliance program."

80

Focus on Corporate Culture and Financial Incentives

- "[R]esourcing a compliance department is not enough; it must also be backed by, and integrated into, a corporate culture that rejects wrongdoing for the sake of profit."
- Companies should hold financially accountable all individuals who contribute to criminal misconduct by, e.g., employing "clawback provisions" and/or escrowing compensation.
- "Compensation systems that clearly and effectively impose financial penalties for misconduct can deter risky behavior and foster a culture of compliance.
- Companies should also promote compliance by using affirmative benchmarks to reward compliance-promoting behavior.

More Governance.	Executive	Compensation.	ESG and	SEC	Uodates	

O 11



Focus on Corporate Culture and **Financial Incentives**

- "Going forward, when prosecutors evaluate the strength of a company's compliance program, they will consider whether its compensation systems reward compliance and impose financial sanctions on employees, executives, or directors whose direct or supervisory actions or omissions contributed to criminal conduct.
- Criminal Division to provide further guidance by end of year on how to reward corporations that employ clawback or similar arrangements.



82



Focus on "Ephemeral Messaging"

DOJ prosecutors should consider, among other things, "whether the corporation has implemented effective policies and procedures governing the use of personal devices and third-party messaging platforms to ensure that business-related electronic data and communications are preserved.'

More Governance, Executive Compensation, ESG and SEC Updates 0 as



83

84



Focus on "Ephemeral Messaging"

Prosecutors should also consider whether a corporation seeking cooperation credit in connection with an investigation has instituted policies to ensure that it will be able to collect and provide to the government all non-privileged responsive documents relevant to the investigation, including work-related communications (e.g., texts, e-messages, or chats), and data contained on phones, tablets, or other devices that are used by its employees for business purposes.

More Gov	ernance. Executive	Compensation, Et	SG and SEC Updates

0 u







CONTINUE

Focus on "Ephemeral Messaging"

"We continue to see in multiple investigations instances where one party or firm that used off-channel communications has preserved and produced them, while the other has not. Not only do these failures delay and obstruct investigations, they raise broader accountability, integrity and spoliation issues. A proactive compliance approach requires market participants to not wait for an enforcement action to put in place appropriate policies and procedures to preserve these communications and anticipate these emerging challenges."

SEC Director of Enforcement, Gurbir S. Grewal, Oct. 6, 2021

segre Drinker Biddle & Raeth LLP, All Rights Reserved, Privleged & Confidential.

More Government Executive Communication ESG and SEC Undates



85



86

The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation Tool in Government Enforcement

- Domestic and international government authorities consistently stress the same core components of a corporate compliance program:
 - U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations
- DOJ Fraud Section's Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP)
- DOJ Antitrust Division Guidance
- OFAC Compliance Framework
- U.K. Financial Conduct Authority Financial Crime Guide
- U.K. Bribery Act Guidance
- World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines

Governance. Executive Compensation. ESG and SEC Updates

The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation Tool in Government Enforcement The United States Sentencing Guidelines Organizations can receive a reduction in their culpability score if their compliance programs meet certain requirements, meaning that a company may receive a significantly lower fine.

The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations "The Filip Factors"

DOJ prosecutors are required to consider "the adequacy and effectiveness of the
corporation's compliance program at the time of the offense, as well as at the time of a
charging decision," meaning an adequate compliance program may mitigate the terms of
a criminal resolution or avoid one altogether.

223 Føegre Drinker			

Executive Compensation, ESG and SEC Updates



88

The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation Tool in Government Enforcement

- On June 1, 2020, the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice released updated guidance to its prosecutors on how to evaluate the design, implementation, and effective operation of corporate compliance programs:
 - A company's assessment of risks is the "starting point" for evaluating the design of compliance programs, and under the guidance prosecutors should probe how the risk assessment informed "why the company has chosen to set up the compliance program the way that it has, and why and how the company's compliance program has evolved over time."

© 2023 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved. Privileged & Confidential.

ore Governance, Executive Compensation, ESG and SEC Updates



89

The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation Tool in Government Enforcement

- DOJ Fraud Section's Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP)
- Presumption that a company will receive a declination absent aggravating circumstances when it voluntarily self-discloses misconduct, fully cooperates, and provides "timely and appropriate" remediation.
- The CEP defines timely and appropriate remediation to include: "Implementation of an
 effective compliance and ethics program" measured by, among other items, a culture of
 compliance, the dedication of resources, the authority and independence of the
 compliance function, and the effectiveness of a company's risk assessment,
 auditing and reporting functions.

© 2021 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved. Privileged & Confidential.

sserved. Privileged & Confidential.



The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation **Tool in Government Enforcement**

- The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
- Four factors identified in the Seaboard Report used when determining appropriate charges and remedies are self-policing, self-reporting, remediation, and cooperation.
- In addressing corporate "self-policing" the SEC asks:
 - How did the misconduct arise? Is it the result of pressure placed on employees to achieve specific results, or a tone of lawlessness set by those in control of the company? What compliance procedures were in place to prevent the misconduct now uncovered? Why did those procedures fail to stop or inhibit the wrongful conduct?

2023 Føegre Drinker	Diddle & Reath	LLP. All Righ	ts Reserved.	Privileged & C	onfidential.



91

The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation **Tool in Government Enforcement**

- The Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, published jointly by the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
- The guide contains the "hallmarks of effective compliance programs" that DOJ and the SEC consider when evaluating corporate compliance programs in the context of an FCPA enforcement action (but which in practice apply more broadly):
 - Commitment from Senior Management
 - Clearly Articulated Policies
 - Code of Conduct
 - Oversight, Autonomy and Resources
 - Testing and Risk Assessment



92

The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation **Tool in Government Enforcement**

- U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
- "A firm's efforts to combat financial crime should be subject to challenge. We expect senior management to ensure that policies and procedures are appropriate and followed." Self-assessment questions are:
 - How does your firm ensure that its approach to reviewing the effectiveness of financial crime systems controls is comprehensive?
 - What are the findings of recent internal audits and compliance reviews on topics related to financial crime?
 - How has the firm progressed remedial measures?





The Role of Compliance as a Risk Mitigation Tool in Government Enforcement The U.K. Bribery Act • Affirmative defense of "adequate procedures" which can shield a company from prosecution for the strict liability offense of failing to prevent bribery. • Ministry of Justice Guidance sets forth factors which may be considered adequate in evaluating corporate compliance programs: — Proportionate procedures — Top-level commitment — Risk assessment — Due diligence — Communication (including training) — Monitoring and review







